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Abstract—Energy storage units (ESUs), including electric vehi-
cles and home batteries, enable several attractive features in the
future smart grid such as effective demand response and reduced
electric bills. However, uncoordinated charging of ESUs stresses
the power system. In this paper, we propose centralized and
decentralized privacy-preserving and collusion-resistant charging
coordination schemes. The centralized charging coordination
(CCC) scheme is used in case there is a robust communication
infrastructure that connects the ESUs to a charging coordina-
tor (CC) run by the utility, while the decentralized charging
coordination (DCC) scheme is useful in case of remote areas or
isolated microgrids where a robust infrastructure is not available
or costly. In the CCC, each ESU should acquire anonymous and
unlinkable tokens from the CC to authenticate their charging
requests and send them to the CC via a local aggregator. By
this way, if the CC and the aggregator collude, they cannot
identify senders’ of the charging requests. Moreover, by sending
multiple charging requests with random TCC and SoC by each
ESU (instead of only request) that follow a truncated normal
distribution, the CC cannot link the data charging requests
sent from the same ESU in different time slots to to preserve
privacy. After receiving the charging requests, the CC can
prioritize the requests and run an optimization technique to
maximize the amount of power delivered to the ESUs before
the charging requests expire without exceeding the maximum
charging capacity. In the DCC scheme, charging is coordinated
in a distributed way using data aggaregation technique. The idea
is that each ESU should select some ESUs called proxies and share
a secret mask with each proxy. Then, each ESU should add a
mask to its charging report and encrypt it using homomorphic
encryption, so that by aggregating all requests all must are
nullified and the total charging demand for each priority level
is known so that each ESU can compute its charging schedule.
Due to using masking technique, DCC is secure against collusion.
The results of extensive experiments and simulations confirm that
our schemes are efficient, secure against various attacks, and can
preserve ESU owner’s privacy.
Index Terms—Privacy-preserving, Collusion, Charging coordi-
nation, Energy storage units, Smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy storage units (ESUs), including home batteries and
electric vehicles (EVs), will play a major role in the future
smart grid. They can store energy when there is a surplus
in energy generation and inject energy to the grid to balance
the energy demand and supply, which in turn enhances the
power grid resilience [1]. Moreover, ESUs can also facilitate
the use of renewable energy generators by storing the excess
energy generated [2]. Moreover, ESUs can also help electricity
consumers to reduce their electricity bills by charging from
the grid during low-tariff periods and power the houses during
high-tariff periods. However, despite their benefits, ESUs pose
several challenges that should be addressed for smoothing their
integration with the power grid.
The simultaneous uncoordinated charging of ESUs may
result in lack of balance between the charging demand and
the energy supply. For example, after work, most of the
EVs’ owners usually return home and plug in their EVs to
charge. The uncoordinated charging may result in stressing
the distribution system and the instability of the grid [3], and
could lead to a power outage in severe cases. To avoid such
consequences, there is a substantial need for a charging coor-
dination mechanism [4]. Typically, in a charging coordination
mechanism, ESUs need to send charging requests that have
data such as the time-to-complete-charging (TCC), the battery
state-of-charge (SoC), and the amount of required charging.
Then, a charging controller (CC) can use these data to compute
priority indices and the ESUs with the highest priorities should
charge first without exceeding the maximum charging capacity,
while other ESUs charging is deferred to future time slot [1].
Unfortunately, the data that should be reported to the CC can
reveal sensitive information about the ESUs’ owners such as
the location of an EV’s owner, when an ESU owner returns
home, whether ESUs’ owners are on travel, etc. To the best of
our knowledge, many schemes were presented in the literature
to deal with coordinated ESUs charging issues [2], [5], [6], but
they do not take the privacy issue into consideration.
In this paper, we propose two privacy-preserving and
collusion-resistant charging coordination schemes: Centralized
Charging Coordination (CCC) scheme, and Decentralized
Charging Coordination (DCC). The CCC scheme is used in
case of connected microgrids while DCC scheme is used
in case of isolated microgrids (island mode). Connected mi-
crogids are connected to the main grid and charging coor-
dination should be done at the grid operators’ level, but the
isolated microgrids are not connected to the main grid due
to their remoteness or failure to connect to the grid. In the
latter case, various sources of distributed energy generators
including renewable energy sources are the only solution to
meet the energy needs of the isolated microgrids’ consumers,
and the microgrid should function autonomously.
The idea of the CCC scheme is that each ESU should
use anonymous tokens acquired from the CC to authenticate
its charging request and send it to a local aggregator which
forwards the request to the CC. The CC uses the data reported
by the ESUs to run an optimization scheme to compute the
charging requests and send them back to the ESUs.
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2To tackle collusion attacks in [1], [7], we use partial blind
signatures to generate tokens for ESUs. Tokens can be used
to anonymously authenticate ESUs without exposing their real
identities. However, since the CC can link charging requests in
different time slots to the same ESU since ESUs send requests
with TTC and SoC which is slightly changed in consecutive
time slots. To mitigate this problem, instead of sending one
request, an ESU should split its charging request into several
random requests that are closer to the main request priority.
Therefore, an ESU would have different TTC and SoC in
consecutive time slots while maintaining its priority. In this
way, linking a charging request to a specific ESU becomes
difficult while allowing the ESU to charge before the TCC
expires.
In DCC scheme, one node (or more than one) is selected
as a head node. Each ESU should select a set of ESUs called
proxies and share a mask with them. Each ESU then should
add the mask to their charging requests, encrypt them using
homomorphic encryption, and send them to the head node.
Then, it should aggregate all the ciphertexts received, and
masks cancels each other to obtain the total charging needs
of the community of ESUs. Then, the head node broadcasts
the aggregated message and if the needs are higher than the
total charging capacity, the ESUs should adjust their charging
demands so that the total energy demand is equal to maximum
charging capacity. This adjustment is made so that most of the
reduction is made by the ESUs that have low priority, i.e., their
SoC and TCC are large.
Our main contributions and the challenges the paper aims
to address can be summarized as follows.
• We carefully studied the successful probability of link-
ability attacks by the CC in the centralized mode of
communication using SoC and/or TTC, and both the TTC
and SoC.
• A privacy-preserving centralized charging coordination
scheme is proposed. Linkability attacks is mitigated so
the CC can not link whether two charging requests
in different time-slots are from the same ESU or not.
Moreover, collusion between the CC and the aggregator
is mitigated using anonymous tokens obtained by each
ESU.
• A privacy-preserving decentralized scheme is proposed.
The scheme resists to collusion attacks among ESUs
so that no one can learn the charging requests of the
individual ESUs.
• Extensive simulations and analysis are conducted to eval-
uate the proposed schemes. The results indicate that our
schemes can coordinate charging activities while pre-
serving privacy and mitigating linkability and collusion
attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe
the network and threat models, followed by the design goal
of our schemes in Section II. In Section III, we discuss
preliminaries used by this research work. Then, the centralized
and decentralized schemes are presented in Section IV and V
respectively. Detailed security and privacy analysis are pro-
vided in Section VI. In Section VII, we discuss performance
evaluation for our schemes. Section VIII presents the related
work. Finally, we give concluding remarks in Section IX
followed by acknowledgement in Section. X
II. MODELS AND DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we present the considered network model
followed by the adversary and threat models, and then, we
introduce the design goals of our schemes.
A. Network Models
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the CCC model has a number of
communities and a charging controller (CC). Each community
can be one neighborhood or all the loads connected to the
same electric bus. It has a group of energy storage units
(ESUs) and one aggregator. The storage units can be EVs
or batteries installed in homes. The aggregator and the CC
can communicate via WIMAX or 4G. The communication
between the ESUs and the aggregator is assumed to be wireless
using either WiFi or LTE [8]. The CC cannot communicate
with the storage units directly, but this has to be done via
the aggregators. The ESUs send charging requests to the
aggregator to forward them to the CC. The CC prepares
charging schedules and send them back to the ESUs.
As shown in Fig. 2, the DCC scheme only has ESUs that
can communicate with the other ESUs either directly sing
wireless communication, WiFi or LTE/5G or using multihops
data transmission relying on secure and privacy preserving
mechanisms such as [9]. ESUs can play different roles. For
example, one ESU can act as a head ESU and this ESU
can change in each time slot. The head ESU should receive
charging requests from the other ESUs, aggregate and decrypt
them, and finally broadcast the aggregated message. Some
ESUs can act as routers to relay other ESUs messages. Other
ESUs ESUs can inject power to the grid while others need to
charge.
B. Adversary and Threat Model
In both CCC and DCC, an honest-but-curious model is
considered, which assumes that the attackers do not aim to
disturb the proper operation of the scheme, yet they are just
interested in gathering private information about other ESUs.
The attackers in the CCC can be the aggregator, the CC,
ESUs, and eavesdroppers who may passively snoop on the
communications to learn sensitive information but should not
learn whether an ESU needs to charge or not. We consider
a collusion attack between internal attackers (aggregator and
CC) so they collude to identify ESUs and link charging re-
quests to a specific ESU. Also, the CC can launch a linkability
attack using the SoC and/or TCC of charging requests to infer
ESU’s sensitive information.
In the DCC, the attackers can be eavesdroppers that eaves-
drop on the communications of the ESUs and try to figure out
some information, and can also be ESUs including the head
ESU. The attackers can work individually or they can collude
to launch stronger attacks. The collusion attack is considered
between malicious ESUs and the head node ESU. The concept
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Fig. 2: Decentralized mode of communication.
we use is that to reveal a charging report of an ESU, a
number of ESUs should collude, and more protection against
collusion attack can be realized by increasing this number.
Since the messages are aggregated and only the sum of the
aggregated requests are known to the head node, linkability is
not considered.
C. Design Goals
The main objectives of the centralized/decentralized charg-
ing coordination schemes are as follows.
• Privacy-preserving charging activities. In case of the
CCC, the CC can know the TCC and SoC of an ESU to
run the charging coordination scheme without knowing
any sensitive information that could breach the privacy
of the ESU. Also, in case of DCC, no single ESU should
know the charging information of other ESUs.
• Resist to collusion attacks. Both schemes should mitigate
collusion attacks between the CC and local aggregators
in the CCC and between the head node and other ESUs
in the DCC. This objective is required to preserve ESUs
owners’ privacy.
• Resist to linkability attacks. In case of the CCC, the
ability of CC to link charging requests data i.e., SoC
and/or TTC to a specific ESU should be mitigated.
TABLE I: Notations
Notation Description
B(m) Blined message m
PBScx(B(m))
Partially blined signaure on message m where
c is the common appended message.
q,G1, G2, P, e Public parameters of bilinear pairing
(N, g), λ Public/private key of homomorphic encryption
Svi , Tvi SoC/TTC of an ESU vi
R(j)vi A charging request j from an ESU vi
R(j,k)vi
Individual n charging requests of the request
R(j)vi , 1 ≤ k ≤ n
S
(j,k)
vi , T (j,k)vi , U (j,k)vi SoC, TTC, priority for R(j,k)vi
• Data integrity and authenticity. Since charging requests
can be modified during transmission to (aggregator/CC
in the CCC) or (head-nodes in DCC), the CC/head-
nodes should verify the integrity of received messages
while identifying the attackers who modify the messages.
Also, the CC/head-node should ensure that messages was
computed by the intended users in the network.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the necessary background on
bilinear pairing, partial blind signature, and homomorphic
encryption that we will use in this paper. Notations used in
the paper are given in Table. I.
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group with generator P and
order of prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group
with the same order. Let e: G1×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map
with the following properties.
• Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab, where P,Q ∈ G1,
and a, b ∈ Zq .
• Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q ∈ G1 such that
e(P,Q) 6= 1.
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
B. Partial Blind Signature
Blind Signature is a cryptographic scheme in which the
sender of a message is able to get the signature on this
message from the singing party while concealing the content
of the message. Partial Blind Signature (PBS) is a special
case of Blind Signature where the signer can include in the
signed message information that is known to both singer and
sender, such as a time or date [10]. A brief description of PBS
proposed in [11] is given as follows.
1) The signer picks a random element d ∈R Z∗q as the private
key and computes public key Ppub = dP , where P is the
generator of a cyclic additive group G1.
2) The requester randomly chooses a number r ∈R Z∗q and
computes B(m) = Ho(m||c) + r(H(c)P + Ppub), where
B(m) is the blinded message m, H is hash function such
that H0: {0,1}∗ → Z∗q , H0 is hash function such that
H: {0,1}∗ → G1, and c is the common information e.g.,
expiry date. Then, he sends B(m) to the signer.
43) The signer sends back PBScx(B(m)) = (H(c) +
d)−1B(m) to the requester.
4) The requester applies unblinded operation B−1 to
PBScd(B(m)) to obtain PBScd(m) as follows.
B−1
(
PBScd(B(m))
)
= PBScd(B(m))− rP =
Ho(m‖c)
H(c) + d
= PBScd(m) (1)
Where B−1 denotes the secret key r that is known only
to the requester.
Finally, the requester can use m‖PBScx(m) to authenticate
himself anonymously and the signer can accept the signature
by checking:
e(H(c)P + Ppub,PBScd(m)) ?= e(P,Ho(m||c))
C. Paillier Cryptosystem and Homomorphic Encryption
Paillier cryptosystem [12] is one of the most popular tech-
niques to achieve homomorphic additive encryption. In Paillier
cryptosystem, if two integers A and B are encrypted as Ek(A)
and Ek(B) with a same key k, there exists a relationship
between plaintext operation and ciphertext operation, such that
Ek(A) · Ek(B) = Ek(A+ B)
Generally, Paillier cryptosystem is composed of the following
phases: key generation, encryption, and decryption.
1) Key Generation: Select two large and independent prime
numbers p and q randomly, and we compute λ = lcm(p−
1, q − 1) and N = p · q where λ is the least common
multiple of p−1 and q−1. Then, define a function L(x) =
x−1
N , choose a generator g = (1 +N), and compute µ =(
L
(
gλ mod N2
))−1
mod N . The public key is (N, g),
and the private key is (λ, µ).
2) Encryption: Given message m ∈ Z∗N , first, we select a
random number r ∈ Z∗N2 , and then the ciphertext can be
computed as follows:
C = E(m) = gm · rN mod N2
3) Decryption: Let C be the ciphertext to decrypt, where
C ∈ Z∗N2 , and we can compute the plaintext message as
m = L
(Cλ mod N2) · µ mod N
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING AND COLLUSION-RESISTANT
CENTRALIZED CHARGING COORDINATION SCHEME
In this section, we first start with the problem formulation
in the CCC mode of communication by discussing linkability
attacks. Then, we discuss in details our CCC proposed scheme.
A. Motivation and Problem formulation
In the CCC, the CC should have access to SoC and TCC of
ESUs’ charging requests to perform the charging schedules
among them. However, since the CC has this information
over several times slots for all the ESUs, he could monitor
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Fig. 3: Successful probability of different linkability attacks
with low resolution of SoC.
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Fig. 4: Successful probability of different linkability attacks
with high resolution of SoC.
requests over time and infer that charging requests are sent
from the same ESU, which would violate the privacy of ESU
owners. This attack is known as a linkability attack. Typically,
a linkability attack succeeds when an ESU is not scheduled
for charging in a time slot, and it has to send a new charging
request in the next time slot so that the difference between
SoC and TCC of the two-time slots’ requests is small.
To give empirical results of linkability attacks in CCC, we
used Matlab and simulation parameters are set as follows. The
maximum charging capacity of a community is 1000 KW,
the battery maximum charging capacity was set to 100 kW,
and the number of ESUs is set to 150. TCC and SoC were
selected randomly based on uniform distribution form from
{1, · · · , 48} in time slots and [1, 50] kW respectively. Three
attacks can be used to link charging requests to the same
ESU. 1 Attack 1: using SoC. 2 Attack 2: Using TCC. 3
Attack 3: A combination of both SoC and TCC is used. Two
cases are considered for all attacks; low-resolution and high-
resolution values for SoC. Also, 100 runs were performed in
all experiments, and the average was taken.
As shown in Fig. 3, for a low resolution of SoC, charging
request linkability attack can experience considerable levels
of success. For instance, the average probability of success is
above 0.75, 0.65, and 0.95 for Attack 1, Attack 2 and Attack
3, respectively in case of 20 ESUs. While it reaches 0.2 in
the case of Attack 1 when the number of ESUs increases to
5v CC
Agg
msg1 := Bv
(
τ
(`)
v
)
‖TS‖σv
msg2 := PBSm0SCC
(
Bv
(
τ
(`)
v
))
msg3 := τ
(`)
v ‖PBSm0Sτ
(
τ (`)v
)
‖r(j,k)v ‖TS‖σ(`)v
msg4 := τ
(`)
v1 ‖r(j,k)v1 , · · · , τ (`)vN ‖r(j,k)vN
‖σagg‖SigAgg
msg5 = {scv1 , scv2 , · · · }‖SigCC
msg5 = {scv1 , scv2 , · · · }‖SigCC
Fig. 5: Exchanged messages in the CCC scheme.
140, or below 0.2 in the case of Attack 2, however, when
the combination of SoC and TCC is used in Attack 3, the
likelihood of success is considerably higher, reaching values
of over 0.80. This is because as more ESUs submit requests,
the likelihood of similarity among requests increases, which
explains the drop in the success rate of linkability attacks as
the number of ESUs increases.
On the other side, for a high-resolution values of SoC, it
can be clearly seen that from Fig. 4 that the success rate
of the attacks increases considerably comparing to Fig. 3.
This is noticeable in Attack 3, where the success probability
reaches 0.97 even with a high number of ESUs as 140. In
the case of Attack 2, the success probability is not affected
significantly comparing to Fig. 3. This behaviour is attributed
to the shorter range TCC values as opposed to those of SoC
that is considerably larger. With a larger set of possible values
for SoC, it becomes easier to single out distinct pairs of
requests. This contributed to the increased level of success
of the likability attack, either when SoC was used by itself,
or in combination with TCC.
It can be concluded that Attack 1 is always more successful
than Attack 2, because SoC has a larger range of values than
TCC. This makes it easier for the CC to distinguish unique
requests as there is more range of values each request can take.
Also, Attack 3 is always more successful than Attacks 1 and
2 since Attack 3 can benefit from the range of values of SoC,
and the additional information of TCC that can contribute to
the success of the attack.
The results of the above experiments demonstrate that the
number of requests submitted from a community would need
to be sufficiently large in order to make data linkability attack
unsuccessful. Motivated by these results, in the next sections,
we discuss in details our privacy-preserving and collusion-
resistant scheme for a centralized mode of communication.
B. Acquisition of Tokens
In this phase, each ESU should acquire a number of
cryptographic tokens from the CC. These tokens are used to
anonymously authenticate the ESU and also help it to share a
key with the CC to encrypt the charging schedules. Acquisition
of tokens is illustrated in Fig. 5.
Assume that the CC has a public/private key pair
(PCC , Scc). Each ESU v should acquire m tokens. For each
token denoted as τ (`)v , where 1 ≤ ` ≤ m, v generates a pub-
lic/private key pair PK(`)v /SK
(`)
v and computes [K
(`)
vi→cc]Pcc
which is a symmetric key K(`)vi→cc encrypted by the public key
of the CC (Pcc). Then, τ
(`)
v can be expressed by the following
tuple.
τ (`)v = PK
(`)
v ‖[K(`)v→cc]PKcc
Then, v should send msg1 to the CC that is:
msg1 := RID‖Bv(τ (`)v )‖TS‖σv
Where RID is the vehicle true identity e.g., certificate,
Bv(τ (`)v ) is the blinded message of the public key and secret
encrypted key, TS is the time-stamp, and σv is the signature
on the whole message using its true identity (e.g., ECDSA).
Note that σv reveals the ESU v’s true identity and appending
the time-stamp as part of the request to protect against packet
replay attack.
Then, once the CC receives msg1 from the ESU, it verifies
the legitimacy and authenticity of the request by verifying
the signature provided in σv . In addition, it checks that the
request’s time-stamp (TS) matches the current time. If all the
verifications succeed, the CC signs the request and sends a
partially-blind-signature msg2 back to the ESU as follows.
msg2 := PBSm0Scc
(
Bv
(
τ (`)v
))
Where m0 = TE‖IDg is the appended common message
that is expiry date (TE) and the identifier of the community
IDg . Then the v applies unblided operation B−1v to obtain the
signature on the token τ (`)v .
B−1v
(
PBSm0Scc
(
Bv
(
τ (`)v
)))
= PBSm0Sτ
(
τ (`)v
)
Finally, v uses τ (`)v and CC anonymous signature
PBSm0Sτ (τ
(`)
v ) to authenticate itself anonymously to its local
aggregator and the CC.
C. Charging Requests Submission
In this subsection, we discuss how an ESU sends their
charging requests to the CC anonymously while mitigating
linkability attacks.
1) Computing Charging Request’s: Following [1], the pri-
ority of an ESU (v) in a given time-slot can be mathematically
expressed using its SoC and TTC as follows.
Uv = α1(1− Sv) + α2F (Tv), (2)
6Where F (Tv) is a decreasing function of TCC Tv with a
range of [0, 1] such that F (Tv) = 0 for long TCC and equals
1 for short TCC, and SoC value (Sv) ∈ [0, 1] with Sv = 1 for
a completely charged ESU. Our strategy to mitigate linkablity
attacks is described as follows.
For a charging request denoted as R(j)v where j is the current
time-slot, v creates n individual sub-requests, each request is
denoted as R(j,k)v where (1 ≤ k ≤ n). Each request R(j,k)v
should be sent independently during the same time slot. To
calculate the SoC and TCC of each sub-request of R(j,k)v , v it
first uses its S(j)v and T (j)v of the main request R(j)v to compute
its priority U (j)v using Eq. 2. Then, using U
(j)
v , it computes
n random priorities {U (j,1)v , · · · , U (j,n)v } for each individual
request of R(j)v . Finally, for each individual priority U
(j,k)
v , it
calculates random tuples of S(j,k)v and T (j,k)v that can achieve
the priority U (j,k)v using Eq. 2.
To implement this idea, let the main priority U (j)v has
a probability P(j)v , and we want to get n sub probabilities
{P(j,k)v , · · · ,P(j,n)v } such that they are: 1 close or equal
to P(j)v . 2 random in each time. 3 in range of [0,1]
since 0 ≤ Uv ≤ 1. Thus, to achieve previous requirements
mathematically, we can sample from a PDF of a truncated
normal distribution [13] for the following reasons. Firstly, most
probably the values in truncated normal distribution are close
to the distribution mean (requirement 1 ) . Secondly, sampling
means randomness (requirement 2 ). Thirdly, it is bounded
from a and b which can be mapped to [0, 1] (requirement
3 ).
According to [13], the PDF of the truncated normal distri-
bution is given by.
ψ(µ, s, a, b;x) =

0 if x ≤ a
φ( x−µs )
s(Φ( b−µs )−Φ( a−µs ))
if a < x < b
0 if b ≤ x
(3)
Where µ and s are the mean and variance and a, b specify
the lower and upper truncation interval. In addition, φ and
Φ are the PDF and CDF of the standard normal distribution
respectively that are given as follows:
φ (x) =
1√
2pi
e−x
2/2 (4)
Φ (x) =
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
x√
2
))
(5)
where erf is the standard error function [14]
To sample from the PDF of truncated normal distribu-
tion (i.e., Eq. 3), we can use inverse transform sampling
method [15]. In this method, we first calculate the CDF of
Eq. 3 then we get the inverse function of the CDF. Subse-
quently, we sample form known distribution such as uniform
distribution and substituting the sample in the inverse function
of the CDF. Thus, we can get a sample from the truncated
normal distribution. This can be done as follows.
First, the CDF of truncated normal distribution in (3) can
be given by
Ψ(µ, s, a, b;x) =

0 if x ≤ a
Φ( x−µs )−Φ( a−µs )
Φ( b−µs )−Φ( a−µs )
if a < x < b
1 if b ≤ x
(6)
To sample from a truncated normal distribution, we assume
we have some function rand() which is a source of uniform
random numbers in the range [0,1] which we use to apply the
inverse CDF function as follows:
p = rand()
x = Ψ−1(µ, s, a, b; p)
where Φ−1 can be calculated from Eq. 6 to get x
x = Φ−1(Φ(
a− µ
s
) + p ∗ (Φ(b− µ
s
) + Φ(
a− µ
s
))) ∗ s+ µ
Here Φ−1(y) is given by
√
2 erf −1(2y − 1).
Fig. 6, gives the probability distribution of the function at
different values for the priority Uv namely 0.2, 0.4, and 0.9
and at different value for s. As shown in Fig. 6a, when s =
0.4, there are overlaps between the distributions of different Uv
when s = 0.4. This helps in making linkability attacks difficult
since ESUs with different requests will have close priorities.
As illustrated in Fig. 6b, 6c, varying the values of s results
in values of U (j,k)v that are either more densely concentrated
around U (j)v , as in Fig. 6b, or more dispersed as in Fig. 6c.
As the values of s are made smaller, linkability attacks would
have better chances of succeeding since the values of U (j,k)v
tend to be very close to each other, consequently they could
be linked to an ESU. On the other hand, large values of s
result in dispersed priority values, and as a consequence, the
linking two charging requests and associating them with an
ESU becomes harder. On the other hand, large values of s
would cause priorities to have a wide range of possible values,
and as a consequence, the ESU’s charging requests would not
maintain priorities U (j,k)v close to U
(j)
v , causing the charging
performance to decrease. The opposite applies to small values
of s.
As indicated in Algorithm 1, ESU v selects priorities
U
(j,k)
v for each individual request of R(j,k)v using the random
selection from the truncated normal distribution (See line 6
in Algorithm 1). Then, it uses each priority U (j,k)v to compute
random S(j,k)v and T (j,k)v (See line 5-13 in Algorithm 1). Note
that SoC and TCC for each request is computed at random so
that (i) S(j,k)v and T (j,k)v give U (j,k)v using Eq. 2, and (ii)∑n
i=1 S
(j,k)
v = S
(j)
v . Also, T (j,k)v associated with S(j,k)v is
computed using Eq. 2 (See line 12 in Algorithm 1). Lastly, the
last request S(j,n)v is computed (See line 14 in Algorithm 1),
with random priority selection of the request’s priority and
corresponding T (j,n)v (See line 16 in Algorithm 1).
2) Submitting Charging Requests to the aggreagtor: After
an ESU vi computes the requests’ SoC and TCC, it should
use the anonymous tokens previously acquired from the CC
7(a) s = 0.4. (b) s = 0.05. (c) s = 0.85.
Fig. 6: Probability of priority values.
Algorithm 1: pseudocode of Computing SoC and TCC of
individual charging requests
1 Input: U(j)v , n, α1, α2
2 Uv[ ]: Array of randomly generated priorities
3 Sv[ ]: Array of SoC of individual charging requests
4 Tv [ ]: Array of TTC of individual charging requests
5 for k = 1 to n-1 do
// Random U(j,k)v selection based on U
(j)
v using
truncated normal distribution
6 U(j,k)v = Random_Priority_Selection(U
(j)
v )
// Computing SoC of individual charging requests
7 if (k=1) then
8 Sv[k] = rand(Sv);
9 else
10 Sv[k] = rand(Sv-
∑n−1
k=1Sv[k]);
11 end
// Computing TTC of individual charging requests
12 T (j,k)v = α2/(Uv-(α1×S(j,k)v ))
13 end
// Computing SoC and TTC of last charging request
14 Sj,nv = S
j
v -
∑n−1
k=1S
j,k
v
15 U(j,n)v = Random_Priority_Selection(U
(j)
v )
16 T (j,n)v = α2/(U(j)v -(α1×S(j,n)v ))
17 Output (S(j,k)v [ ],T (j,k)v [ ])
to compose the charging requests and send them to its local
aggregator. To do that, vi sends it charging request to the
aggreagtor by sending msg3
msg3 := τ
(`)
vi ‖PBSm0Scc(τ (`)vi )‖r(j,k)vi ‖TS‖σ(`)vi .
Where msg3 contains a token τ
(l)
vi , CC signature on it,
r
(j,k)
vi = [S
(j,k)
vi ‖T (j,k)vi ]K(`)vi→cc that is the SoC and TTC en-
crypted with the a shared secret key, time-stamp, and signature
of the ESU on the entire message. Note that the signature
should be done using a secret key that corresponds to a public
key included in the token.
D. Charging Request’s Aggregation and Verification
When the charging requests reach the aggregator (and
later the CC), they need to be verified for authenticity and
integrity. As the number of ESUs in individual communities
increases, the number of requests also increases, and thus more
computation is needed for verifying each request signature.
What makes the problem worse is that each ESU sends
multiple requests. Therefore, to avoid causing congestions and
delays in the communication, once the aggregator receives
ESUs’ requests in the community within any given time,
he/she should aggregate the tokens’ signatures, similar to the
approach presented in [11] as follows.
The CC signature on a token τ (`)vi takes the following form
according to (1).
PBSm0Scc(τ (`)vi ) =
Ho(τ (`)vi ‖mo)
H(mo) + Scc
Then, once the aggreagtor receives N token’s signature,
he/she can aggregate all of them into one aggregated signature
as follows.
σagg =
N∑
i=1
PBSm0Scc(τ (`)vi )
=
Ho(τ (`)v1 ‖mo) + · · ·+ Ho(τ (`)vN ‖mo))
H(mo) + Scc
=
∑N
i=1Ho(τ (`)vi ‖mo)
H(mo) + Scc
(7)
Then, the aggreagtor sends msg4 to the local aggreagtor.
msg4 := τ
(`)
vi )‖r(j,k)vi , · · · , τ (`)vN )‖r(j,k)vN ‖σagg‖SigAgg.
Note that msg4 contains all charging requests within a
specific time slot. Also, it contains the aggreagtor’ signature
on the entire message SigAgg .
E. Computing Charging Schedules
In this phase, once the CC receives the charging requests
and their aggregated signature, he verifies the aggregated
signature σagg by checking the following equality:
e(H(mo)P + Pcc, σagg) ?= e(P,
N∑
i=1
H0(τ
(`)
vi ‖m0)) (8)
Also, to prevent token reuse, a table of previously used
tokens should be stored on at the CC side called token expired
table. This table should include the hash of each expired
token or has been used. Then, the CC checks whether the
received tokens in msg4 are expired or being reused. If all
8these verifications succeed, the CC proceeds with computing
the charge schedules for the requests using their values of SoC
and TCC as follows.
Let a community is connected to an electric bus with a
loading limit of C. At a given time slot, the regular load
capacity is given by PR. Thus, the accessible charging limit
with respect to the ESUs at a given time slot is given by
C − PR. Our goal is to let each ESUs with high priorities to
charge at the present time slot, while other ESUs’ charging
requests can be postponed to future time slots. Similar to [1],
the charging coordination problem determine whether an ESU
v to be charged in the current time slot (yv) and the charging
mount (pv) so as to charge the ESUs with the highest priorities,
i.e.,
max
yv,pv
∑
v∈V
yvUv
s.t. 0 ≤ pv ≤ Pv ∀v ∈ V,∑
v∈V
yvpv ≤ C − PR,
yv ∈ {0, 1}.
(9)
Problem (9) is a mixed integer program (MIP) as it involves
a real variable pv and a binary variable yv , which makes it NP-
complete. For a large size problem (i.e., a large community
with many ESUs), it is hard to solve (9) in real-time. Instead
of solving the MIP in (9), we resort to an integer program (IP)
formulation, which is less complex than (9), and is given by
max
yv∈{0,1}
∑
v∈V
yvUv
s.t.
∑
v∈V
yvPv ≤ C − PR.
(10)
According to (10), if an ESU is scheduled to charge during
the current time slot, it will receive its full charging request
(Pv) in the current (single) time slot. The scheduling problem
in (10) can be mapped to an optimization problem referred
to as the knapsack problem [16]. In the knapsack problem,
there is a knapsack with limited capacity and a set of items
each with a given value (priority) and weight. The goal is to
choose a subset of items to be packed in the knapsack, such
that the total value is maximized while the knapsack capacity
limitation is respected. The charging coordination problem can
be mapped to a knapsack problem as follows. The ESUs are
mapped to the items, the ESU priority Uv is equivalent to the
item value, the ESU charging demand Pv is equivalent to the
item weight, and the charging capacity limitation C − PR is
equivalent to the knapsack capacity. A greedy algorithm for
solving the knapsack problem in polynomial time complexity
can be used to schedule ESU charging during a given time
slot [16]. Hence, the charging coordination mechanism can be
described using Algorithm 2, which is executed by the CC.
Once the CC finalizes the charging coordination, he should
prepare the charging schedules {scv1 , scv2 , · · · }, and signs and
sends them to the aggregator. The charging schedule (scv =
PKv, EKv (yv, pv)) should have the encryption of the schedule
using the one-time key sent by the ESU. Then, the CC sends
Algorithm 2: ESU Charging Coordination Mechanism
Input: V, Uv and Pv ∀v ∈ V;
Initialization: yv = 0 ∀v ∈ V, A = {},
CR ← C − PR;
Sort all ESUs in V such that U1
P1
≥ U2
P2
. . . ≥ UV
PV
and store the result in A;
for v ∈ A do
if Pv ≤ CR then
yv = 1;
pv = Pv;
CR = CR − PV ;
A = A− \{v};
end if
end for
L = argmax
A
Uv;
yL = 1;
pL = CR;
Output: X and P.
the following message msg5 to the aggregator
msg5 = {scv1 , scv2 , · · · }‖SigCC .
Finally, Once the aggregator received msg5 broadcast it
within the community. Each ESU can know its charging
schedule by that corresponds to the public key included in
the charging schedule. Then, can determine to charge by
decrypting the schedule using the shared secret key.
V. PRIVACY-PRESERVING AND COLLUSION-RESISTANT
DECENTRALIZED CHARGING COORDINATION SCHEME
In this section, we discuss in details our proposed DCC
scheme. The scheme is described in details in the following
phases: overview, system initialization, charging report format,
charging requests submission, verification, and aggregation of
charging requests, and charging schedule computation.
A. Overview
The scheme is run in a fully distributed way where several
ESUs should run the scheme to collect the total amount of
power that can be injected by some ESUs and in the same
time coordinate charging demands. However, the challenge
is how a group of ESUs can collect individual requests,
aggregate them, and then disseminate the aggregated demands
without support from infrastructure and with protection against
collusion attacks. In other words, although the ESUs are not
trusted, they should run the scheme and achieve protection
against collusion attacks. Mitigating collusion attacks is a
real challenge and hard, especially in infrastructureless setting
and the absence of trusted entities. To do that, one ESU is
selected as a head node denoted as vH . Each ESU should
select a number of ESUs called proxies who add a mask to
their charging messages. The head node should decrypt the
ciphertext of the aggregated messages of the ESUs’ messages
and broadcast the aggregated message of charging demands to
the community but without being able to access each ESUs’
demand. Then, each ESU can decide whether to charge or not
according to its charging priority.
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Fig. 7: The sum of the bits at j-th column represents the total
charging demand/injected power of ESUs with a level `.
B. System Initialization
During the initialization phase, each ESU i should generate
a public/private key pair Yi and xi, where the private key xi
R← Z∗q , the public key is Yi = xiP , q is a large prime number,
and P is the generator of a cyclic additive group G1. Then,
the ESUs show their public key to a certificate authority to
receive a certificate Certi. The certificate and public/private
key pair are used to authenticate ESUs. A head node should
generate public key (NvH , gvH ) and corresponding private key
λvH for homomorphic encryption scheme, and broadcast the
public key.
C. Charging packet Format
As depicted in Fig. 7, a charging packet message is divided
into two portions where the first portion (the rightmost bits)
is dedicated to ESUs reporting injected power into the electric
grid, and the second portion (the leftmost bits) is dedicated to
ESUs needing power from the grid for their charging. Each
portion is divided into levels, as illustrated in Fig. 7. For
example, the priority levels of the first portion is divided into
priority range (e.g., P1 ∈ [0, 0.1),P2 ∈ [0.1, 0.2), · · · , and
P10 ∈ [0.9, 1]), and each priority level has a set of associated
bits used to report the amount of charging each ESU needs
After an ESU calculates its priority using Eq. 2, and if its
priority is on level 3 and it needs to charge 16kW, it has to
write its charging need in the set corresponding to its charging
priority level and write zeros in the other sets, (See R2 in Fig.
7). Note that since all messages should be aggregated and
to avoid arithmetic overflow, each level should be assigned
sufficient bits to avoid adding a carry for the next level.
D. Charging packet Submission
In this phase, ESUs submits their charging messages to the
head node as follows. Each ESU i chooses a shared secret
mask si. This mask is shared with a group of nearby ESUs
called proxies such that each proxy has a mask si,j for 1 ≤
j ≤ k where k is the number of proxy ESUs such that
si +
k∑
j=1
(si,j) = 0
Then, to report a charging message Ri, each ESU i uses
the public key of the head node’s homomorphic encryption
(NvH , gvH ) and a random number r ∈ Z∗n where r is known
to all ESUs (e.g., r = H(date) where H is a hash function and
date is the current date) to compute Ci which is the encryption
of Ri as follows.
Ci = gRivH r(NvH+si) mod N2vH .
Then, the ESU signs Ci after appending a time stamp by
computing αv = xiH (Ci‖TS). The ESU sends to the head
node the following packet Ci‖TS‖αi.
After the n ESUs in the neighborhood report their messages
to the head node, it verifies the charging message’s signatures
with less overhead (fewer number of pairing operations), using
a batch verification technique [17]. In this technique, instead
of verifying M individual signatures, the signatures can be
batched and one verification process is executed. The signa-
tures are valid if
(
P,
∑M
v=1 αv
)
=
∏M
v=1 e (Yv, H (Cv‖TS)).
The proof for this is as follows:
e
(
P,
M∑
v=1
αv
)
= e
(
P,
M∑
v=1
xvH (Cv‖TS)
)
.
=
M∏
v=1
e (P, xvH (Cv‖TS))
=
M∏
v=1
e (Yv, H (Cv||TS))
Finally, if the signature verification succeeds, the head node
should aggregate the ciphertexts as follows:
CT = C1 × C2 × . . .× Cn
= gR1vH r
(NvH+si) mod N2vH × . . .× gRnvH r(NvH+sn) mod N2vH
= g
∑n
i=1 Ri
vH × r
∑n
i=1 si × r(n)N
Then, the head node should use its private key (λvH )
to decrypt CT and obtain RT =
∑n
i=1Ri by computing
L
(
CλvHT mod N2vH
)
L
(
g
λvH
vH
mod N2vH
) mod NvH . By aggregating all the mes-
sages, the set of bits that corresponds to a level `, gives the
total power needed/injected by all the ESUs in the community.
Note that the purpose of adding a mask by an ESU i and
removing it by other proxy ESUs’ messages is to:
1) Prevent vH from knowing the demand of one ESU
because given Ci = gRirN+si , vH cannot use its private
key to decrypt the message because the exponent of r
should be N , but given CT = g
∑n
i=1 Ri(rn)N , vH can
decrypt this message using its private key. Note that rn
or r does not make a difference in the decryption because
both are random numbers.
2) Protect against collusion attack since to get the charging
demand of an ESU i, vH has to collude with all the proxy
ESUs to obtain si,j for j = {1, 2, ..., k} to compute si
and then compute Ri as follows:
r−siCi = gRirN+sir−si = gRirN
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Fig. 8: En example of exchanged messages between the head
node and other ESUs in a community.
Note that, for simplicity, it is assumed that there is only
one head node, but the scheme can easily be extended to have
multiple head nodes. Therefore, if one head node is not trusted
in reporting the total demand correctly, aggregation can be
done by more than one head node and the total demand can
be broadcasted by the head nodes. Also, the head nodes should
continuously change to distribute the overhead of decrypting
the aggregated message on the community nodes.
E. Charging Schedules Computation
After vH computes the aggregated charging messages (RT ),
the head node sends a broadcast message that contains the
aggregated message to all the ESUs. Note that RT contains
two portions, the leftmost bits are the charging demands RLT ,
and the rightmost bits is the injected power requests RRT .
Then, if RLT ≤ RRT , then all requests are granted to charge
since there is enough energy to service the demands of all
the ESUs. On the other hand, if RLT > R
R
T , then ESUs with
highest priority should charge without exceeding the maximum
capacity RRT . Each ESU compares R
R
T to the total charging
demand of priority levels, from the highest level to the lowest
level, until it finds the first level set where their total demand
is greater than or equal to the maximum charging capacity
(from the highest priority set to a level L). If the total charge
capacity RRT is equal to the total charging demand of these
sets, then all the ESUs that in a priority level set less than
L can charge. If the power demand of all the sets from the
highest priority to priority level L is greater than the total
charging capacity, then all the ESUs that have priority at least
L + 1 should charge and for full utilization of the available
charging power capacity, the remaining power (δ) is charged
by the ESUs of priority level L as follows. The power Ei that
an ESU i should charge is given by:
Ei = ∆× Ri
R
(L,L)
T
(11)
TABLE II: Initial charging demands and priorities
ESU i
Power demand
(kW) (Ri)
Priority (P) Level (`)
1 10 0.333 4
2 30 0.250 3
3 50 1 10
4 60 0.166 2
5 90 0.333 4
6 20 0.143 2
7 5 0.143 2
8 40 0.500 6
9 20 1 10
10 70 0.200 3
Total 395
Where R(L,L)T is the demand energy by the ESUs with
priority level L, and ∆ is given by
∆ = C −
`max∑
i=L+1
R
(L,i)
T (12)
Where `max as the maximum priority level and L +
1 the lowest priority level that guarantees the condition∑`max
i=L+1R
(L,i)
T ≤ RRT .
F. Illustrative Numerical Example
To illustrate the idea, we present a numerical example using
ten ESUs and a community capacity RRT of 300kW. Table II
gives the varying power demands and priorities for each ESU
that are selected arbitrarily. Table III gives the corresponding
charging requests for all ESUs.
Once the head node vH computes the total charging message
(See RT row in Table III), RT is broadcasted to all ESUs
in the community. After receiving this message, each ESU
finds the priority level L that exceeds the community capacity
R
(R
T , and determine whether they can charge or if they
need to reduce their charging demands by using Eq. 11. In
this example, L is level 4, since
∑10
i=4R
(i)
T = 210kW, and
including level 3 would result in exceeding the capacity since∑10
i=3R
(L,i)
T = 310kW. By using Eq. 12, ∆ = 300kW - 210kW
= 90kW. Because priority level 3 was the first level exceeding
the capacity, all ESUs with at least level 4 can proceed to
charge. Additionally, those at level 3 i.e., ESUs 2 and 10, use
Eq. 11 to compute the amount of energy they can charge, and
those with level 2 or below, should not charge in the current
time slot and need to submit new charging requests in the next
time slot.
Finally, Table III gives the results of the charging com-
putation, where the second column gives the initial charging
request, and the third column gives the charging schedule
including the amount of power each ESU can charge.
VI. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate and analyze security and privacy
of our schemes.
A. CCC scheme Analysis
1) Resist to linkabilty attacks: By submitting multiple
requests with random SoC and TCC instead of only one, it
11
TABLE III: Charging packets and priority levels
ESU P10 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P3 P2 P1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0
3 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
8 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0
9 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 0
RT 70 0 0 0 40 100 0 100 85 0
TABLE IV: Initial and final charging
ESU i
Original
demand (Ri) Schedule (Ei)
1 10 10
2 30 27
3 50 50
4 60 0
5 90 90
6 20 0
7 5 0
8 40 40
9 20 20
10 70 63
Total 395 300
is hard for the CC to link requests sent from the same ESU
using SoC and TCC. However, since the priorities of requests
of an ESU are proportional to its main priority the CC could
use this information to attempt linkability attacks on charging
requests. However, due to the probabilistic nature of priorities
of the charging requests, the priorities of the charging requests
of different ESUs may overlap which can confuse the CC and
make the linkability difficult.
In order to assess our scheme under various linkability at-
tack scenarios, different linkablity attack cases are considered
in our evaluation; (i) Using both SoC and TCC. (ii) Using
charging requests’ priorities. (iii) Using charging requests’
priorities using transition probability matrix of transitions of
priority values.
The transition matrix is a table of probabilities of transi-
tioning an ESU’s request priority from time slot t− 1 to time
slot t, where the rows represent the priorities at the time t− 1
and the columns are priorities at time t, and states represent
the different values that priorities can have. For instance, if in
time slot t− 1, a given request of an ESU has a priority value
of 0.7, and it transitions to a state of priority of 0.5 in time slot
t, then in the transition probability matrix, the element in row
i associated with 0.7, and column j associated with 0.5, would
show the probability of transition from state 0.7 to 0.5 from
time slot t− 1 to time slot t. The transition probability pi,j is
defined as the transition probability of transitioning from state
i to state j, and pi,i is the probability of transitioning to the
same state. Thus, the state transition probability matrix TPi,j
can be written as:
TPi,j =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
U1,1 U1,2 U1,3 ... U1,j
U2,1 U2,2 U2,3 ... U2,j
U3,1 U3,2 U3,3 ... U3,j
...
...
...
...
Ui,1 Ui,2 Ui,3 ... Ui,j
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
Additionally, since the transition should always land in a
given state, the sum of all entries in any given row of TP
is equal to one [18]. In order to launch a charging request
linkability attack, the transition probability matrix TP can be
used to find the most likely priority i observed in time t− 1
and link it to the priority j observed at time t.
We have used Matlab to evaluate success probability of
different linkability attacks cases. We set the number of
ESUs to 80, and the community charging capacity was set
at 1000kW. We set the ESUs’ battery capacity to 100 units
of power, and the SoC of each ESU battery is a random
number uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The TCC range was
set to {1, · · · , 48} and a total of 30 time slots. The values of
α1 and α2 were selected as 0.9 and 0.1 respectively.
The simulations results depicted in Fig. 9a presents the
probability of successful linkability attack using SoC and TTC.
It can be clearly seen that our scheme reduces the ability of CC
to launch a successful linkability attack using SoC and TTC at
different time-slots. Also, as the number of requests per ESUs
increases, as the probability of successfully linking charging
requests decreases. The likelihood of successful linkability
attack is very close to zero with 20 ESUs with our scheme,
as opposed to being close to one even when the number of
ESUs is 80.
In case of using priorities of ESUs to launch linkability
attacks, Fig. 9b show that low success probability compared to
the previous case, i.e., using SoC and TCC. This is because of
using of short-range values of priorities, i.e., from 0 to 1, and
the use of a priority function that transforms the SoC and TCC
values using a non-linear function resulting in priority values
in consecutive time slots for the same ESU that could be close
to each other. Also, in case of an increasing number of requests
per ESU, results show similar performance since our scheme
ensures priority of several requests will overlap, making it very
hard to the CC to use the priority to link charging requests of
ESUs at different time-slots.
Fig. 9c, gives the probability of a successful likability attack
using the transition matrix without and with our scheme. It
can be seen that in our scheme, the success of linkability
attacks using the transition matrix approach is reduced. This
is attributed to the variations of priority among the charging
requests per ESU that tend to reduce the probability of the
most likely priority transition among requests in two consec-
utive time slots. Also, there is a tendency for the probability
to decrease as the number of ESUs increases. This is because,
with a large number of ESUs, the chances of finding requests
with similar priority transitions increases, and consequently,
distinguishing from requests between time slots based on
priority becomes more difficult.
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Fig. 9: Evaluation of successful linkability attacks cases.
2) The centralized scheme meets the following secu-
rity/privacy features:
1) Resist to collusion attack between the CC and aggregator.
By using PBS during the acquisition of anonymous
tokens, each ESU can anonymously send its charging
requests to the aggregator without the need to reveal its
real identity. By using a one-time generated identity that
is not linkable to an ESU, the privacy of the ESUs is
preserved.
2) Achieves data authentication. All the messages in our
scheme are authenticated to ensure that legitimate ESUs
send those messages. This authentication is done using
signatures. Each ESU obtains anonymous tokens signed
by the CC. The CC verifies the signature once a token
is used along with a charging request. This signature on
the anonymous token guarantees that the request is sent
by a legitimate ESU member of a community, as only
legitimate ESUs in this community could obtain valid
tokens from the CC because the ESU should sign to
obtain tokens.
3) Resist to replay attacks and token reuse. To prevent replay
attacks, all the messages in our scheme have a signed
fresh timestamp. In addition, since the CC keeps a record
of previously used tokens by storing their hash values. If
an ESU attempts to reuse a token, the CC can detect and
discard this request.
4) Achieves confidentiality of SoC and TCC. The SoC and
TCC are encrypted with a symmetric encryption key
that is only known to the CC and the ESU sending the
charging request. Also, the encryption key is encrypted by
the CC’s public key and the ciphertext is sent to the CC.
This ensures that only the CC can decrypt the ciphertext
and use the symmetric encryption key when sending the
charging schedule back to the ESU.
B. DCC scheme Analysis
The DCC meets the following security/privacy features.
• Privacy-Preserving charging activities. In DCC, any ESU
can not know charging report messages of other ESUs.
This is done by aggregation and secret masks addition.
By using aggregation, only the total charging report can
be known. By using secret masks to mask the ESUs’
messages, the head node that knows the private key
of the homomorphic encryption scheme has to collude
with a number of ESUs (proxy ESUs) to decrypt the
message, using the mask shared with the proxy ESUs.
With using enough number of proxy ESUs, the attack
can be infeasable because the head ESU has to collude
with a large number of proxy ESUs.
• Resist to collusion attacks. If m ESUs are considered
malicious nodes colluding with the head node from a total
of n ESUs in the community, with m > δ, and δ is the
number of proxy ESUs, the probability of vH colluding
with all δ ESUs out of a total of n ESUs, follows a
hypergeometric distribution. The probability distribution
function (PDF) of the hypergeometric probability distri-
bution is given by:
pdf(x|n,m, δ) =
(
m
x
)(
n−m
δ−x
)(
n
δ
)
where x is the number of malicious ESUs included in
the selection of δ ESUs out of n ESUs. This probability
distribution corresponds to the number of successful
selections of δ proxies among m malicious ESUs, using
samples of size δ without replacements, meaning that
a different set of δ proxies is used during every new
sample.
The probability of the vH colluding with all δ proxy
nodes is plotted in Figure 10 based on various values
of m and δ, where the number of ESUs in the network is
n = 300. From Fig. 10, it can be clearly seen that when
an ESU selects δ = 4 proxies, roughly 1% out of the
total number of ESUs in the community, and the number
of malicious ESUs is m = 100, or 30% of the total n
ESUs, the probability of revealing a charging demand of
an ESU by vH is 0.07 for the case of selecting 8 proxy
ESUs, the probability of revealing a charging demand
of an ESU drops to 0.01. As the number of proxies
increases, it becomes more difficult for vH to recover
a the charging demands of the ESUs. Note that if the
number of proxies selected is δ = 16, the probability
of recovering a charging demand by vH becomes zero.
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Fig. 10: Probability of revealing a charging request data by
colluding with δ proxies.
This is under the assumption that there are already 100
malicious nodes colluding with vH , which in reality is
a very large number. If the number of malicious ESUs
is increased to 200, or 66% of the total ESUs in the
community, then the probability of revealing a charging
request data by the vH becomes one. If further security
and privacy is needed, then the number of proxy ESUs
should be increased, targetting a higher ratio of proxy
ESUs to the total n ESUs.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Charging coordination Performance Evaluation
1) Metrics and Baselines: In both schemes, we consider
charging index as the performance metric which is defined
used as the number of ESUs with charging requests that expire
without fully charging. Lower values of this metric indicate
higher ESU charging energy and hence efficient utilization of
the grid resources and smarter scheduling of ESUs charging.
We will compare both our charging coordination schemes with
first come first serve (FCFS) benchmark. In this approach, the
ESU that requests charging first gets charged first regardless
of the request expiry time and SoC.
2) CCC Evaluation: To evaluate the charging coordination
in the centralized scheme, simulations parameters were set as
follows. The community capacity C was set to 1000kW, with
the number of ESUs ranged from 1 to 45 with increments of
one in every run. The maximum energy demand per ESU was
set to 100kW, with the SoC and TCC of the ESUs assigned
randomly using uniform distribution. Each run was conducted
over a period of 30 time slots.
Fig. 11a gives the number of ESUs that do not fully charge
before TCC expires versus the number of ESUs. It can be
seen that our scheme outperforms the FCFS scheme, and this
performance improvement is noticeably more significant when
the number of ESUs increases. With the parameters used, the
improvement starts when the number of ESUs is 20. This is
attributed to the fact that unlike FCFS scheme, our scheme
prioritizes the requests and charge the high priority requests
before they expire.
3) DCC Evaluation: To evaluate the charging coordination
for the DCC, simulation set up were conducted as follows. The
capacity C is assumed to be 1,000kW, with the priority of each
charging request per ESU was computed using Eq. 2 with TCC
values are selected randomly from 1 to 48, and SoC values are
selected randomly from 1 to 100kW. In addition ten different
levels of priorities are used, where level 1 corresponds to [0,
0.1), level 2 corresponds to [0.1, 0.2), and so on until level
10, which corresponds to the range of priorities [0, 1). The
number of ESUs was varied with increments of one in each
run, ranging from 1 to 45, and 30 time slots were considered.
For each number of ESU, 100 runs were performed and the
average is presented in the given results.
Fig. 11b gives the number of ESUs that were not able
to charge before their charging request expired. It can be
observed that the proposed DCC outperforms FCFS, by al-
lowing a greater number of ESUs to charge with the available
energy resources. A noticeable increase in the number of ESUs
without full charge is observed when 20 ESUs compete for the
available allocated community capacity. The number of ESUs
leaving without full charge in FCFS is greater than that of the
proposed scheme because unlike our scheme that uses priority
to select the ESUs that should charge first, FCFS charges based
on the time of arrival of the ESU’s request. Additionally, with
larger increments of the number of ESUs, the performance gap
widens considerably between the two schemes.
B. Communication overhead
We assume for the DCC that the average number of levels in
the charging message by each ESU is 20, each level identifier
requires 5 B, and the time-stamp requires 8 B. Our signature
scheme uses elliptic curve cryptography that has smaller key
sizes than the RivestShamirAdleman (RSA) scheme for the
same security level. The security strength of 224-bit key
in ECC is equivalent to that of 2048-bit key in the RSA
cryptosystem [19]. Using an elliptic curve additive group of
order 224 bits, the signature’s size is 56 B [20]. Using these
numbers, we will calculate the packet size in our schemes.
1) CCC Evaluation: We discuss the communication over-
head of the CCC as per Fig. 5. The size of the one-time public
key is 56 B, assuming that the order of q is 224 bits and 56 B
for the one-time symmetric key that is encrypted by the CC’s
public key.
In the acquisition of tokens phase, an ESU needs to send
msg1 that has 56 B for the blinded token message, 8 B for the
time-stamp, and signature. The total size of the packet is 120
B. The CC should reply with msg2 that contains partial blind
signature that is 65 B. A charging request msg3 contains 112
B for the token, 56 for the BPS, 16 B for ciphertext of SoC and
TCC, 8 B for the time-stamp and 56 B for its signature on the
whole message. The total is 248 B. msg4 contains all charging
requests within a time-slot. msg4 contains N tokens as well
as the PBS of CC signature on each token, and the cipher-text
of SoC and TTC, i.e., N × (112 + 16), also it contains 56
for aggregated signature and 56 for the aggregator’s signature
on the whole message. Therefore, the total size of msg4 is
given as function of number of requests N within a time a
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
5 Requests
3 Requests
1 Request
FCFS 1 Req.
(a) CCC evaluation.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
One Request
FCFS 1 Req.
(b) DCC evaluation.
Fig. 11: Charging coordination evaluation.
slot as: 128×N + 112 B. Finally, msg5 contains all charging
schedules within a time-slot. It contains the schedule encrypted
by the symmetric key of the ESU (16 B) and a signature on
the whole message (56 B). Therefore, the total size of msg5
as a function of N is given as N × 16 + 56 B.
2) DCC Evaluation: In DCC, the size of the packet that
is sent from a head node to publicize the public keys is 164
B. The size of the homomorphic encryption’s ciphertext is
equal to double N . If we choose N to be 2048 bits, then the
ciphertext size equals to 512 B. The charging report packet
includes the homomorphic encryption, timestamp, and the
ESU’ signature. The total packet size is 576 B.
C. Computation overhead
We measured the computation time of the multiplication,
pairing, and exponentiation operations using Python charm
cryptographic library [21] running on Intel Cor i5-7300HQ
CPU 2.50GHz × 4 with 8 GB Ram. We used supersingular
elliptic curve with the asymmetric Type 3 pairing of size 224
bits (MNT224 curve) for bilinear pairing. Our measurements
indicate that the multiplication (Mul), exponentiation (Exp),
and pairing (Pair) operations take 0.005, 9, and 4.4 ms,
respectively. Note that the addition operation is relatively very
small so it can be neglected. For symmetric encryption, we
used AES-128, the encryption operation (Enc) took 0.0203
ms while the decryption operation (Dec) took 0.0078 ms.
1) CCC Evaluation: In the acquisition of tokens phase, an
ESU needs 5×Mul= 0.025 ms. The CC needs 1×Mul+ 1×
Pair = 4.45 ms. To send a charging request to the aggregator,
an ESU needs 1×Mul+1×EnC = 0.025 ms. Upon receiving
charging requsets N , the aggreagor needs to verify a batch of
signatures rather than verifying individual signatures. Batch
and individual signature verifications require N + 1 and 2N
pairing operations, respectively.
Finally, the CC needs to verify the aggregated signature by
N + 1 pairing operations and executing N decryption (Dec)
operation. Then, preparing the charging schedules that by N×
Enc. Therefore, the total is (N+1)×Pair+N×(Enc + Dnc) =
4.4×N ms.
2) DCC Evaluation: In DCC, the computation overhead is
as follows.
• ESUs: Each ESU encrypt its charging report with one
exponential and one multiplication operation to sign
its message. The ESU takes 10.15 ms to compose its
charging report packet.
• The head node: verifies a batch of signatures rather
than verifying individual signatures. Batch and individual
signature verifications require M + 1 and 2M pairing
operations, respectively. The head node decrypt the aggre-
gated charging messages by computing one exponential
operation. Thus, to aggregate and sign 100 charging
report, for example, the head node needs 1.3 s.
3) DCC Evaluation: In DCC, the computation overhead is
as follows.
• ESUs: Each ESU encrypt its charging report with one
exponential and one multiplication operation to sign
its message. The ESU takes 10.15 ms to compose its
charging report packet.
• The head node: verifies a batch of signatures rather
than verifying individual signatures. Batch and individual
signature verifications require M + 1 and 2M pairing
operations, respectively. The head node decrypt the aggre-
gated charging messages by computing one exponential
operation. Thus, to aggregate and sign 100 charging
report, for example, the head node needs 1.3 s.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Although several privacy preserving schemes have been
developed for different networks, such as vehicular ad hoc
networks [22], [23], ad hoc wireless networks [24], [25],
and smart grid [26]–[28], the privacy problem we address is
different. Several works have investigated the problem of coor-
dinated PEV charging in the smart grid, such as [29], but they
do not take privacy into consideration. In [30], a distributed
V2G control system is proposed to satisfy the PEVs’ charging
requirements. Tushar et. al. [31] propose an energy manage-
ment technique to encourage the PEVs owners to participate in
energy trading using a game theoretic approach. Sortomme et.
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al. [32] develp an algorithm to optimize energy and ancillary
services scheduling. The algorithm maximizes profits to the
PEVs while providing additional system flexibility and peak
load shaving to the utility and low costs of PEV charging
to the customer. Although smart grid has recently received
extensive attention [33], [34], preserving the privacy of the
PEVs communications has not been well investigated yet. In
[35], we have proposed a privacy preserving communication
protocol for power injection in smart grid. The aggregator
collects masked bids from the storage units and sends the
aggregated bid to the utility company rather than sending
individual bids. The proposed scheme cannot be used for
charging coordination because the CC needs the ESUs’ indi-
vidual charging demands. In [36], an authentication protocol
for PEVs has been proposed to protect the location of the
PEVs. Li et. al. [37] proposed an anonymous and authenticated
reporting scheme for PEVs. Unlike [36], [37] that address the
privacy problem for PEVs on roads and charging stations, we
consider different network model by addressing the problem
for energy units of communities. Moreover, since the pro-
posed scheme in [37] is fully antonymous, it is impossible
to identify misbehaving PEVs. In [38], the authors used a
data obfuscation mechanism and proposed secure and efficient
algorithms to distribute obfuscation values within an AMI
network. They presented a protocol that utilizes LTE cellular
network for exchanging of data among various gateways.
An efficient privacy-preserving data collection scheme for
smart grid AMI networks is proposed in [39]. By using a
lightweight symmetric-key-cryptography and hashing opera-
tions, the proposed scheme can collect the consumption data
while preserving the customer privacy. The authors use the
asymmetric key cryptography operations for key management
that is executed every long time. In [8], Akula et al. proposed
a privacy-preserving scheme for power injection in smart grid
that is based on the idea of aggregation of sensitive information
of the storage units’ owners to prevent the utility from knowing
individual’s sensitive information. The proposed scheme can
be used for the authentication of the storage units and the
integrity of their data.
In [40], a decentralized charging coordination has been
proposed based on the blockchain to enable a transparent,
reliable charging coordination among ESUs. However, while
blockchain can reduce the reliance on intermediaries [41], the
scheme can not be used where there is no reliable communi-
cation like developing countries.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper. we proposed two privacy-preserving and
collusion-resistant charging coordination schemes for Smart
grid. In the centralized scheme, collusion is mitigated by using
partial blinded signatures form the CC. In the centralized
scheme, to mitigate collusion between the CC and the aggreag-
tor, each energy storage unit (ESU) should acquire anonymous
tokens from the CC to send multiple charging requests to
the CC via the aggregator. CC can use the charging requests
to enough data to run the charging coordination scheme,
but but it cannot link the data to particular ESUs or reveal
any private information. In the decentralized scheme, several
ESUs run the scheme in a distributed way with no need to
aggreagator or CC. One ESU is selected as a head node that
should decrypt the ciphertext of the aggregated messages of
the ESUs’ messages and broadcast the aggregated message to
the community but without being able to access the ESUs’
individual messages to preserve privacy. Then, Each ESU
can determine if she can charge or not while not exceeding
the maximum charging capcity of the community. Extensive
simulations are conducted and indicated that our schemes are
efficient and secure against various attacks, and can preserve
ESU owner’s privacy.
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